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The Human Rights Crisis in Sri Lanka: Its
Background and Possible Solutions*
I. INTRODUCTION
This report is concerned with the grave human rights abuses which
are taking place in Sri Lanka against certain political and cultural ele-
ments of its society. An examination of the current human rights situa-
tion in Sri Lanka is set forth and subsequently, the applicable interna-
tional human rights standards are discussed. In the process of arriving at
a possible explanation of these abuses in Sri Lanka, special attention is
paid to particular policies promulgated or sanctioned by the government.
In an attempt to avoid what might otherwise appear to be'a description
of a hopeless situation, certain alternatives are suggested by the authors
as a means by which the government might adequately and effectively
come to terms with the violence in Sri Lanka. Finally, some cursory con-
clusions are made in an attempt to illustrate the pressing need for
changes in Sri Lanka.
A. Factual Background to the Current Problem
Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is not an entirely new phenomenon,' but
the recent increase in political and cultural unrest in this small island
country has added new dimensions to the effective resolution of such
conflict.
It would probably be impossible and of no particular value to deter-
mine how or by whom the current cycle of violence was started. A signifi-
* This report was prepared by Barbara Cashman, Jeanette Laffoon and Ved P. Nanda
as a project of the 1986 Human Rights Advocacy Clinic at the University of Denver College
of Law. The authors would like to thank Laurie Wiseburg of the Human Rights Internet at
Harvard Law School for her assistance in providing valuable research information.
1. The Sinhalese and the Tamils are two separate and distinct races, so it is not sur-
prising that their nineteen century coexistence on the island has not always been peaceful.
The predominantly Buddhist Sinhala race is of Aryan origin, and is believed to have been
founded by an exiled prince from northern India in the fifth century B.C.. The predomi-
nantly Hindu Tamil race is Dravidian, and has its roots in southern India. There are actu-
ally two separate Tamil groups in Sri Lanka. The "Ceylon Tamils" arrived in Sri Lanka as
invaders during the first century A.D., and eventually established their own independent
kingdom in the north. The "Indian Tamils" were brought to the country by the British
during the 19th century to work as laborers on tea and rubber plantations. The Ceylon
Tamils are generally wealthier and more educated than the Indian Tamils, who still live in
extremely impoverished conditions. The Indian Tamils have much closer ties with India
than their wealthier cousins, due to their relatively recent arrival and the fact that they
were disenfranchised by the Sri Lankan government in 1956. Both Tamil groups, however,
share the same ethnic origin and language, which provides a bond that does not exist be-
tween either Tamil group and the Sinhalese.
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cant factor contributing to its continuation, however, has been the re-
sponse of the government. The current government is predominantly of
the Sinhalese majority, and many of its policies directly reflect the major-
ity orientation and the tragic consequences which can stem from an in-
transigence based on a perceived minority threat to its current form of
existence. The Ceylon Tamils as well as certain other groups view such
policies as further steps to entrench the dominance of the majority
Sinhalese, thus supplying their often violent separatist cause with a read-
ily available raison d'etre.
The determination of whether there is in fact a recognizable trend
that may be identified as state terrorism provides useful insights into an-
alyzing the human rights crisis in Sri Lanka. The government of Sri
Lanka is engaging in a policy of what otherwise appears to be systema-
tized coercion and violence against the Tamils.' This policy is met by the
Tamil call for a separate and independent state,3 which in turn perpetu-
ates governmental actions resulting in gross violations of human rights.
Much of the current turmoil in the political climate can be identified
as stemming from the particular form of government and from the effi-
cacy of localized governmental control. A large part of the problem arises
from a fundamental discontinuity which exists between the national ad-
ministration of government and the treatment of local and more regional-
ized concerns. Claims to secede, based on an asserted right to self-deter-
mination, threaten governmental unity, and provide a focus for
government over-reaching. To illustrate the gravity of the human rights
violations which are sanctioned by the Sri Lankan government, violations
of international human rights standards, particular actions and policies of
the government, as well as the reaction of the government against terror-
ist insurgents will be examined below.
2. In recent years a number of reports from such reputable human rights organizations
as Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists have documented
such incidents. See generally, Sri Lanka: Reports of Recent Violations of Human Rights
and Amnesty International's Opposition to Refoulement of the Tamil Community to Sri
Lanka, Amnesty International (Jan. 1985); "Disappearances" in Sri Lanka: A Summary,
Amnesty International (June 1986); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1985, Sri Lanka, at
242-246 (1986); Sri Lanka: Allegations of Extrajudicial Killings by Army Personnel: De-
tails of Some Cases Reported During December 1984 and January 1984, Amnesty Interna-
tional (Apr. 1985); Sri Lanka: Current Human Rights Concerns and Evidence of Extra judi-
cial Killings by the Security Forces, July 1983-April 1984, Amnesty International (1985);
Sri Lanka: A Mounting Tragedy of Errors, International Commission of Jurists (British
Section) (Mar. 1984). See also references to publications by other groups in 10 HUM. RTS.
INTERNET REP. 244-246 (Sept.-Dec. 1984); 10 Hum. RTS. INTERNET REP. 393-396 (Jan.-Apr.
1985); 10 HUM. RTS INTERNET REP. 704-707 (May-Aug. 1985).
3. The separatist movement is especially popular among students, but the political ex-
pression of these sentiments is well-organized and well-funded. Many of the Tamil separa-
tist sympathizers are located in countries other than Sri Lanka (most notably in the United
Kingdom) and engage in very successful publicity efforts. For the titles of some of their
published literature, see infra notes 24 and 46.
VOL. 15:2,3
HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS IN SRI LANKA
B. Violations of International Human Rights Standards
Under international law, states are prohibited from violating the
human rights of individuals found within a nation's borders. Many docu-
ments provide clarification for this norm and also enumerate the more
specific provisions relating to the rights and duties of states concerning
their obligation to respect individual, as well as group human rights.4
Although it does not contain any specific references to the rights of
persons belonging to minority groups, the United Nations Charter pro-
vides a basis for most of the treaties, conventions and other international
instruments which figure importantly in the international promotion and
protection of human rights.6 One of the most important of these instru-
ments, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, prescribes particular
obligations of states concerning the respect of individual human rights.'
The Covenant extends the protection of the various freedoms to all indi-
viduals, without regard to whether they are nationals of the High Con-
tracting Parties.' The most important include: the right to life (Art. 6),
the right to be free from torture (Art. 7), the right to be free from arbi-
trary arrest and detention (Art. 9), the right to liberty of movement and
freedom to chose one's residence (Art. 12), the right to a fair trial with
the presumption of innocence (Art. 14), the right to the protection of the
law against arbitrary interference with privacy, family and home (Art.
17), the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 18), the
right to hold opinions without interference (Art. 19), and the right of as-
sociation (Art. 22). Sri Lanka is a signatory to the Covenants on Civil and
Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and thus is
bound by its terms and provisions.
4. See generally, A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD (1982); T. MERON,
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW MAKING IN THE U.N., 83-126 (1986); P. SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 51-67 (1983).
5. Another important document in this context is the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Particular provisions provide for both political and social rights of minority group
members. For a broad and in-depth discussion of minority rights considerations under inter-
national law, see also F. CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO ETH-
NIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES, (U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as CAPOTORTI].
6. The basis of each state's obligations is expressed in Article 2(1) which reads:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
For a discussion of this particular provision, see Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure:
State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS (L.
Henkin ed., 1980).
7. For a discussion of international treaties concerning the protection of international
human rights and how they interact with state sovereignty, see Geck, International Protec-
tion of Fundamental Freedoms and National Sovereignty, 21 LAW AND STATE 7 (1980). For
a brief discussion of human rights and non-interference, see Bossuyt, Human Rights and
Non-Intervention in Domestic Matters, I.C.J. REV. 45 (Dec. 1985).
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Article 27 of the Covenant states that "[i]n those States in which
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and prac-
tise their own religion, or to use their own language." The principles
enunciated in Article 27 of the Covenant provide for a variety of types of
actions which would constitute a reasonable effort to discontinue and re-
dress the grave human rights situation in Sri Lanka for which the govern-
ment (perhaps not so much for its instigation as for its continuation) is
primarily to blame.
1. The Concept of "Minority" Under International Law And Its
Application To The Tamils of Sri Lanka'
A primary part of the alleged discriminatory practices of the Sri
Lankan government against Tamils stems from the status of the Tamils
as a minority within the Sri Lankan culture, society and government.9
Although the definition and description of the common elements shared
may serve to identify some of the outer bounds of what is known as a
minority, the concept itself is very problematic, particularly under inter-
national law. In a United Nations study of the rights of persons who be-
long to minorities, Francesco Capotorti provides a broad basis for
analysis:
Despite the many references to minorities found in international legal
instruments of all kinds (multilateral conventions, bilateral treaties
and resolution of international organizations), there is no generally ac-
cepted definition of the term "minority." The preparation of a defini-
tion capable of being universally accepted has always proved a task of
such difficulty and complexity that neither the experts in this field
nor the organs of the international agencies have been able to accom-
plish it to date. The reason for this is the number of different aspects
to be considered. Should the concept of a minority be based on the
numerical ratio of the "minority" group to the population as a whole
or is this quantitative aspect secondary or even unimportant? Is it
necessary to limit the concept by introducing the idea of a minimum
size? Should any objective criteria be taken into account. .. ?"
The definition proposed by the the Subcommittee on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (at its third, fourth and fifth
sessions) encompassed six important elements which enabled the Sub-
8. For a discussion of the minority concept as it relates to U.N. bodies and interna-
tional law, see CAPOTORTI, supra note 5.
9. For an historical look at the development of particular forms of resentment between
the two groups, see generally A.J. WILSON, POLITICS IN SRI LANKA 1947-1979 (2d. ed. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as POLITICS IN SRI LANKA]; SRI LANKA: A SURVEY (K.M. de Silva ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as SRI LANKA: A SURVEY]; MODERN SRI LANKA: A SOCIETY IN TRANSITION
(T. Fernando & R.N. Kearney eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as MODERN SRI LANKA: A SOCl-
ETY IN TRANSITION].
10. CAPOTORTI, supra note 5 at 5.
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Commission at its fifth session to draft a resolution concerning the defini-
tion of "minority." This definition was based primarily on the following
elements: (i) the term minority includes only those non-dominant groups
in a population which possess and wish to preserve stable ethnic, religious
or linguistic traditions or characteristics markedly different from those of
the rest of the population; (ii) such minorities should properly include a
number of persons sufficient to preserve such traditions or characteristics;
(iii) such minorities must be loyal to the State of which they are
nationals.1
While it may be difficult to concisely define a minority, it is equally
difficult to conceive of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka as anything but
a minority. The Tamils have their own ethnic, religious and linguistic tra-
ditions which are distinct from those of the Sinhalese, they make up al-
most 20% of the population of Sri Lanka, and at least the Ceylon Tamils
are citizens, and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizenship, in-
cluding loyalty to their country. As a minority, the Tamils must be af-
forded the protections specifically provided for and alluded to in interna-
tional documents.
II. ACTIONS BY THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT
In examining the allegations of serious human rights violations by
the Sri Lankan government and determining the source of these viola-
tions (i.e., whether a policy of gross violations of human rights is being
pursued by the government), it is important to keep in mind the unique
characteristics of state terror. The concept of state terror is a fairly re-
cently recognized means through which a state itself comes to grips with a
perceived internal or external terrorist threat. The methods of state ter-
ror may be either legal or extralegal, but the techniques employed in the
pursuit of this activity are especially illuminating concerning the possible
existence of a policy of state terror against a particular group within the
country's boundaries. The state has some very powerful tools at its dispo-
sal to utilize in the effort to achieve its goals. It may employ discrimina-
tory legislation, fail to provide protection against the crimes or terrorist
acts of others, and may order arbitrary or mass arrests.12
There are various avenues available to the state which pursues the
practice of terror against its inhabitants. Particular policies undertaken
by the Sri Lankan government include the the anti-terrorist campaign
which was begun intensively in 1978, the Prevention of Terrorism Act of
1979, and particular emergency regulations which have given rise to nu-
merous reports of human rights abuse by government officials. Perhaps
11. See E/CN.4/Sub.2/119, para. 32; E/CN.4/Sub.2/140, annex I, draft resolution II; E/
CN.4/Sub.2/149, para. 26.
12. For a discussion of the particular elements and types of character of state terror,
see Lopez, A Scheme for the Analysis of Government as Terrorist, in THE STATE AS TER-
RORIST : THE DYNAMICS OF GOVERNMENTAL VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION (M. Stohl & G. Lopez
eds.1984) [hereinafter cited as THE STATE AS TERRORIST].
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even more frightening are the grave human rights abuses perpetrated by
individual members of the police and armed forces of Sri Lanka. Death
by torture and unexplained disappearances are not formally condoned by
the government, but these activities are, to varying degrees, state-
sanctioned. 3
In addition to the "state-sanctioned" human rights abuses, there is
also a formidable element of backlash in the Sinhalese majority popula-
tion which has been largely uncontrolled in the ranks of the military and
in the civilian sector.'4
A. Legislation and Enforcement Policies
1. The 1948 Constitution
Ceylon's first Constitution was drafted by Lord Soulbury in 1948,
and remained in force until 1972. This Constitution provided for the
rights of minorities; "No . . . law shall . . . make persons of any commu-
nity or religion liable to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of
other communities or religions are not made liable; or ... confer on per-
sons of any community or religion any privilege or advantage which is not
conferred on persons of other communities or religions."' 5 Unfortunately
this provision was ignored by the government when it adopted the Official
Language Act of 1956.
2. The Official Language Act of 1956
While there has been a myriad of social and cultural differences be-
tween the Tamils and Sinhalese which may account for some of the eth-
nic conflicts since independence, the Official Language Act is to blame for
much of the tension which led to early Tamil violence. Its existence con-
tinues to be a source of alienation between the various language groups in
13. A number of documents have illustrated these occurrences. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
14. This lack of control has its roots in attitudes reflected by particular government
officials, as illustrated in an article published in the New York Times:
The Tigers [referring to the separatist terrorist group] flourish because Mr.
Jayewardene tolerates an undisciplined Home Guard force that rampages
freely through Tamil villages. Killings, torture and "disappearances" are rou-
tine, according to an Amnesty International report. Yet as conditions worsen,
the President presents himself as a pro-Western victim of unprovoked terror-
ism and now talks ominously of the "complete liquidation" of Tamil
extremists.
The Peril in Sri Lanka, N.Y.Times, June 13, 1986, at 34, col. 1. See also infra notes (con-
cerning the government's attitude toward the problem as evidenced by its publications re-
lating to Tamil insurgency).
15. 1948 CONSTITUTION OF SRI LANKA, § 29. For a discussion of relevant sections of the
Constitution, see V. A. LEARY, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN SRI LANKA: REPORT OF A
MISSION TO SRI LANKA IN JULY AND AUGUST 1981 (on behalf of the International Commission
of Jurists) (1983), at 11.
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Sri Lanka. 6 It was drafted and adopted by a Sinhalese majority govern-
ment. Three provisions of the Act particularly angered the Tamils. First,
it provided that "Sinhala only" would be the official language of Sri
Lanka." This placed the Tamil language in an inferior position and pro-
vided a rationale for refusing Tamil-speaking people important civil ser-
vice positions. Second, the Act deprived Indian Tamils of their Sri
Lankan citizenship and disenfranchised them.'" This was a slap in the
face to Indian Tamils, and also worked to decrease the official Tamil pop-
ulation in Sri Lanka. Finally, the Act created a quota and standardization
program based on race for university admission. This provision effectively
reduced and limited the number of Tamils who could be admitted to the
universities.
3. The 1972 Constitution
The second Constitution severed legal ties with England and de-
clared Sri Lanka a republic. The protection of minorities found in section
29 of the first Constitution was eliminated, and the statutory "Sinhala
only" language policy was enshrined as a Constitutional provision. The
Tamil party refused to support this new Constitution, and boycotted the
Constituent Assembly that drafted it. Express discrimination against the
Tamil language and the absence of protective provisions for minorities
were the bases for the boycott. 9
4. The 1977 Constitution
Sri Lanka's third Constitution was drafted by the United National
Party (UNP) when it came to power in 1977. The UNP, like the Sri
Lankan Freedom Party (the previous ruling party), is predominantly
Sinhalese. The UNP, however, was more sympathetic to the plight of the
Tamils, and it was hoped that the new Constitution would be responsive
to their grievances. It did declare that Sinhala and Tamil both be recog-
nized as national languages of Sri Lanka, but Sinhala remained the sole
16. The English language, prior to the enactment of the Official Language Act, had
provided an important bridge between these groups.
... Government policies, especially the Official Language Act of 1956 by which
Sinhala replaced English as the official tongue, split residents along ethnic
lines and eroded the linguistic link that might have made the separation less
complete. With 80 percent of the population ethnic Sinhalese, the effect of this
and other laws, Tamils say, was to eclipse their language and to ghettoize their
people, who then suffered further discrimination at work and in school.
Crossette, Sri Lankans Lament Loss of a Linguistic Bridge, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1986, at
2, col. 3.
17. See LEARY, supra note 16 at 12 for a discussion of the "Sinhala only" Act.
18. See id.
19. The framework for the Soulbury Constitution was disregarded by the Constituent
Assembly which formulated and adopted the 1972 constitution. The provision in § 29 of the
1948 Constitution protecting certain Tamil rights (especially those relating to language and
culture) was dropped entirely in the 1972 constitution. See id. at 13.
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official language. Official documents must be published in both languages,
both languages may be used in Parliament, and students may be taught
and examined in the language of their choice. Government service, how-
ever may still be dependent on a working knowledge of the official lan-
guage.20 The new Constitution dropped the requirement of standardiza-
tion of examination scores for university entrance, but maintained the
quota system that limits the number of Tamils that may be admitted.2 '
Some very important additions to the 1977 Constitution are provisions
guaranteeing fundamental rights. These provisions are unfortunately di-
luted by article 15 which permits curtailment of these rights in certain
circumstances, such as during a state of emergency. Attempts were obvi-
ously made to placate the Tamils in the 1977 Constitution, but they were
disappointingly inadequate. As in 1972, the Tamil parties refused to en-
dorse the new Constitution.
5. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No.
48 of 1979
The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) was enacted by the govern-
ment of Sri Lanka as a temporary measure in 1979, as a response to the
increasing terrorist activity in the northern regions of the country. Sec-
tion 29 provided that "[t]he provisions of this Act shall be in operation
for a period of three years from the date of its commencement." The Pre-
vention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act, No. 10 of
1982, however, repealed this section, making the PTA a permanent part
of Sri Lankan law. This was a frightening development which makes the
many human rights complaints lodged particularly against the PTA even
more serious.
The Official Language Act of 1956 and the Constitutions of 1972 and
1977 effectively placed the language, culture, and educational and em-
ployment opportunities of the Tamil minority in an inferior position. It is
reprehensible, but not surprising, that certain members of the minority
reacted with violence. There were no effective legal or political means
available for redressing their grievances. It is of interest to note that the
Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF, the minority political party that
primarily represents the interests of the northern Ceylon Tamils) did not
ratify either of the Constitutions. The PTA, designed to alleviate the ter-
rorist activities, effectively legitimized the government's use of violence in
its efforts to bring "peace" to the island. Rather than quelling the terror-
ist activities, it provided a focus for Tamil anger. The clarity of hindsight
has shown that these legislative policies have fueled the violence and ter-
20. A distinction is drawn between the "official" language of Sinhala and the "national"
languages of Sinhala and Tamil. Persons taking the official examination required for govern-
ment service may be required to learn the official language (Sinhala) within a reasonable
time if they do not already have a sufficient working knowledge of Sinhala. No such require-
ment exists for knowledge of Tamil. See id. at 36-37.
21. Id. at 37.
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rorist activity in Sri Lanka.22
There are a number of techniques available to the state which is in-
terested in bringing a particular group more closely under the govern-
ment's control. Many of these techniques stem from the PTA, but others
employed are based on a broader rhetoric aimed at the preservation of
national unity through the eradication of the internal terrorist threat.
Law enforcement techniques" are probably the single most effective
means of achieving these ends. Apart from a lack of protection against
the terrorist crimes of other citizens,24 violence is the primary means for
the Sri Lankan government to attempt to meet or react to the Tamil
groups' demands for a separate state. Some of these uses of violence are
arbitrary arrest and detention,2" which often result in or are associated
with disappearances and extrajudicial killings.2 6 Allegations of torture
have also been made as examples of serious human rights abuses by the
government of Sri Lanka.2
7
22. For a more in-depth examination of the effect of these early legislation policies, see
LEARY, supra note 16.
23. For a detailed description of actions, either "legal" or "extralegal" by the govern-
ment, and in particular the armed forces, see Genocide Sri Lanka - Report for November
and December 1985, 3 TRANSATLANTIC TAMIL TIMES 11 (Jan.-Feb. 1985).
24. This lack of protection may be experienced by civilians who are victims of violence
by militant pro-government groups, and also those being detained in jails under the Preven-
tion of Terrorism Act. See LAWASIA at 46-47 (Oct. 1985).
25. The gross violations of human rights include not only the "preventive" means of
arbitrary arrest, but the conditions under which the suspected terrorists are held. For a
description of activities carried out under Emergency Regulation 15A, which permits secur-
ity forces to cremate or bury a dead body without a post-mortem, see Violence and Gross
Violations of Human Rights in Sri Lanka, 9 HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNET REPORTER 144-146
(Sept.-Nov. 1983).
26. Amnesty International has issued a number of reports concerning disappearances in
Sri Lanka. See generally, Sri Lanka: Reports of Disappearances in the Eastern Province
(May, 1985); Updated Statement of Amnesty International's Position on Refoulement of
Tamils to Sri Lanka (May, 1985); Sri Lanka: Allegations of Extrajudicial Executions and
"Disappearances" in May 1985 (Oct., 1985); "Disappearances" in Sri Lanka: A Summary
(June, 1986) [hereinafter cited as "Disappearances" in Sri Lanka: A Summary]. An extract
from the last document is particularly illustrative:
In many cases officials deny knowledge of their arrest or detention. In others,
officials have stated that they were released. As of early 1986, Al had received
reports, often accompanied by eye-witness accounts of the arrest, of 194 people
who had "disappeared" between June 1984 and November 1985. All these re-
ports concern members of the Tamil community who were reportedly arrested
in the north and east but Amnesty International also received one report of a
Sinhalese who "disappeared" in July 1983 in the capital Columbo allegedly in
connection with his political activities as a member of the Sri Lankan Freedom
Party at the height of the communal disturbances when a curfew was in force
and when the police had a free hand to operate. Fears have been expressed
that some of the "disappeared" may have died in custody, by having been shot
by security forces personnel or as a result of injuries received under torture.
"Disappearances" in Sri Lanka, A Summary, at 23.
27. Human rights organizations in Sri Lanka, and in particular the Civil Rights Move-
ment (CRM), are concerned with these allegations of torture, especially as they stem pri-
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B. The Ideological Underpinnings of State Terror
What are referred to here as "ideological underpinnings" provide the
rationale and policy justifications for pursuing the particular course of
action the government has chosen. These are important to mention as
they provide insight into both the pattern and character of state terror,
and also determine the parameters of how far the state might go in its
pursuit of such policies.
The particular "form" of government, not in its theoretical or ideo-
logical sense, but rather in response to the form into which it has evolved
(especially regarding participation, representation in government) is the
focal point for discussion concerning any speculation on why the Sri
Lankan government is pursuing this particular policy. The primary
problems which stem from the administration of the Sri Lankan govern-
ment relate primarily to the pluralistic nature of the nation itself. Be-
neath the political machinations, economic considerations have played
and continue to play a very important role.
2 8
In post-colonial Sri Lanka, political processes have taken on a variety
of characters. This development has in turn provided a rationale and a
causal connection for the politically-based grievances expressed by certain
groups in contemporary Sri Lanka, namely the Tamils.2 9
The situation characterized by either minority or majority group in
Sri Lanka at present is the result of the process of evolutionary develop-
ment which has been affected by a number of concerns. These concerns
have often been conflicting, and through the course of development of its
political institutions, any identifiable "balance" which may have once ex-
isted with regard to the influence of particular groups has become a shift-
ing balance3 0 (or perhaps more appropriately termed, a shifting imbal-
ance). By 1978, the Sinhalese Buddhists had had the balance more than
redressed in their favor by successive governments in the post-1956
phase. This has especially been evident in the employment, educational
and commercial sectors.3 ' These concerns continue to be of critical impor-
marily from other serious human rights violations, most notably mass arrests and incommu-
nicado detention (conducted under particular Emergency Regulations). See 10 HUMAN
RIGHTS INTERNET REPORTER 393-395 (Jan.-Apr. 1985); 10 HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNET RE-
PORTER 704-707 (May-Aug. 1985).
28. For a discussion of the interplay between the variety of economic and cultural fac-
tors which have played important roles in the development of Sri Lankan political culture,
see de Silva, Historical Survey, in SRI LANKA: A SURVEY, supra note 9 at 31-85.
29. The mosaic that comprises Sri Lanka's multiracial society has presented two press-
ing problems since independence. The Sinhalese Buddhist majority (Low Country and
Kandyan) have had more specific grievances against the leading ethnic majority, the Ceylon
and Indian Tamils, than the other principal religious grouping the Roman Catholics in par-
ticular, as well as the Protestants (comprising Sinhalese, Tamils, and Burghers). D. Smith,
Religion, Politics, and the Myth of Reconquest in MODERN SRI LANKA: A SOCIETY IN TRANSI-
TION 83 (T. Fernando & R. Kearney, eds. 1979).
30. See generally, id.
31. See POLITICS IN SRI LANKA supra note 9 at 10-51 for a discussion of economic fac-
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•tance not only with respect to the continuation of violence and counter-
violence, but will also remain important factors in any possible peaceful
solutions to the problems.
When seen in an historical light, the political climate and what has
up to the present time developed, can be examined as indications of
changes which have affected the political efficacy of the government.3 2
What may simply have developed in the 1950's as a concern with secta-
rian politics and later became a major concern of continuing govern-
ments, has in large part delineated the ideological course of the govern-
ments headed by members of the Sinhalese majority."3 As the Sinhalese
moved to make Sinhala the only official language and institute a quota
system for university admissions, 3' it became quite apparent that the
Sinhalese were attempting to consolidate their own power in terms of pre-
dominance over rivals in the educational and ethnic fields. These prefer-
ences later found expression in government policies in the 1960's and
1970's and also in the constitution of 1972 (and 1978) in its stated prefer-
ence for fostering and protecting the place of Buddhism. 5
The minority-majority conflict is a recurring theme in any discussion
of Tamil dissatisfaction since the time of independence. State policies re-
lating to religion, language, education, colonization, and police and army
occupation all seem to deny the separate cultural identity of the Tamil
people. The predominantly Sinhalese government refuses to consider an
independent Tamil State, and claims that Sri Lanka is a united country
for Tamils and Sinhalese alike. Yet the Tamils are expected to speak
Sinhala, tolerate a Constitution that elevates Buddhism, accept discrimi-
natory education barriers, and obey Sinhalese police and army officials.
Since 1976 there has been increasing support among the Tamil popu-
lation for a separate state of Tamil Eelam.3 6 Many Tamils consider them-
selves to be an identifiable people with a defined territory and an interna-
tionally protected right of self-determination. Some argue that when ties
were broken with Great Britain in 1972, the Tamil sovereignty that had
existed before colonization was restored. The Tamil boycott of the 1972
and 1977 Constitutions was an indication that they never consented to
Sinhalese sovereignty, and thus the independent Tamil nation remained
intact.3 7 The validity of the self-determination claim is not the issue at
tors in interracial disputes.
32. See, e.g., Samaraweera, The Evolution of a Plural Society, in SRI LANKA: A SURVEY,
supra note 9 at 86-107.
33. See POLITICS IN SRI LANKA, supra note 9, at 14.
34. Id. at 15.
35. The current constitution provides that Buddhism shall occupy the foremost place
relative to other religions (which are not mentioned), and establishes a duty on the part of
the government to protect and foster the Buddhist faith. The constitutionally-established
pre-eminence of Buddhism may be attributed to a "minority complex" which the Sinhalese
Buddhists since they are a minority in Asia. See LEARY, supra note 16 at 9-10.
36. Id. at 14.
37. Id. at 15.
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the moment. The point is that many Tamils ascribe to it, and that belief
has added to the tension and the conflict. The Sinhalese and the Tamils
may all be citizens of the same country, but they are also two distinct
races with different cultures. Somehow this distinction has been ignored
and the consequence was an inevitable escalation of racial tension and
violence.
C. The Action-Reaction Nexus of Violence in the Perpetuation of
Violence
Many of the counter-terrorist policies have been extreme, and have
had very harmful effects on the civil and human rights of all Sri Lankans.
Some of these government actions amount to "terror-tactics" which are
designed to subjugate the rights of those at whom certain actions are
aimed (primarily Ceylon Tamils in the North and Eastern districts)."8
Government actions which effectively amount to state terror-tactics in-
clude mass arrests, arbitrary detention of suspected terrorists, unex-
plained disappearances, and excesses, ill-treatment, and torture by armed
forces and police. Amnesty International has extensively documented a
variety of these actions.3 9
One observer of the situation in Sri Lanka has classified the vio-
lence as three different types. Each type of violence has a different under-
lying basis, and requires a different approach in the search for a solution.
"Communal violence" occurs when the individuals of one ethnic group
attack members of another ethnic group.4 ' In Sri Lanka there have been
four major outbreaks of communal violence between the Sinhalese and
the Tamils, which occurred in 1958, 1977, 1981, and 1983."' The wide-
spread acts of communal violence have for the most part been attacks
against the Tamil people and their property. Much of it appeared to have
been sparked by the terrorist activities in the North against police and
army personnel. Although these activities are perpetrated primarily by a
small group of Tamil militants, the entire race has been implicated in the
minds of many. There is also evidence that the Sinhalese have been in-
38. Concerns of Amnesty International in Sri Lanka have encompassed a broad spec-
trum of human rights violation. A report of substantial importance which concerned disap-
pearances was published in June of 1986 and noted that:
Although some reports of "disappearances" were received during 1983 and the
first half of 1984, a pattern of these human rights violations began to converge
in late 1984, when "disappearances" were reported with increasing frequency:
for example, on one day, 2 December 1984, 99 persons were reportedly taken
away by security forces personnel and have "disappeared."
"Disappearances" in Sri Lanka: A Summary, supra note 27 at 7.
39. See generally, Amnesty International publications at supra notes 2, 27.
40. See Leary, supra note 16.
41. For an expansion on the definition of "communal violence" and a detailed examina-
tion of the events that occurred during these outbreaks of violence in 1958, 1977, 1981, and
1983, see LEARY, supra note 16, at 18.
42. Id. at 24.
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cited to mindless discriminatory anger through speeches made by govern-
ment officials, aided by anti-Tamil slogans and posters.
43
The second type of violence can be labelled "political violence," or
"terrorism." This form of violence, perpetrated by Tamil youths, began
substantially in 1977,"1 and has continued unabated to this day. There are
four major active Tamil "liberation" groups: the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE); the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO);
the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS); and the Ee-
lam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). 5 A fifth group,
the People's Liberation Organization of Tamileelam (PLOT), appears to
be more moderate, but it has been known to attack police stations. 41
The third recognizable form of violence in Sri Lanka is "state terror-
ism," or violence by police and security forces. This type of violence has
been a recurring theme since 1974,"' but has tended to grow in intensity
along with the increase in political violence. State terrorism is especially
reprehensible, as many aspects of it are strictly forbidden under the in-
ternational law of human rights. Terrorism is generally thought to be an
activity engaged in by individuals or groups (i.e., non-state actors), but as
the phenomenon of terrorism has become a major concern in the area of
international relations, the study of terrorism by scholars who are inter-
ested in its causes, effects and seemingly different varieties has signifi-
cantly increased." Through the application of a relatively broad "defini-
43. Id. at 25.
44. Another significant element of violence which is an offshoot of this political violence
is the result of inter-group rivalry. This rivalry has often been bloody, and its impact is felt
not only in the domestic environment, but also has important geopolitical implications as it
has related to the type of support which Prime Minister Gandhi has been willing to provide.
See, Sri Lanka Discovers Bombs as Peace Talks Begin [EROS claimed responsibility for
the planting of two large bombs in Columbo at the time Gandhi was arriving to negotiate
with the government], N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1986, at 19, col. 1; 25 Die as Sri Lanka Rebels
Clash, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1986, at 6, col. 3. See also infra note 53.
45. 1 TAMIL INFORMATION, Issue No.8, (May 15, 1985), at 21.
46. LEARY, supra note 16, at 30.
47. See, e.g., THE STATE As TERRORIST, supra note 13.
48. As a result of U.N. studies on terrorism, and in particular, state-sanctioned terror,
much of the debate regarding terrorism has focused on the role of the rule of law in formu-
lating a response of international organizations to terrorist activity. Three particular legal
claims have been identified in United Nations discussions regarding the nature and scope of
terrorism. Stohl and Lopez have identified these three sources of stalemate concerning the
expression of an idea which would express a working definition of terrorism.
1. The position that terrorism is defined and constituted by the "criminal acts"
taken against governments by individuals or groups. This position was sup-
ported by most of the advanced industrial Western states and some Latin
governments.
2. The position that terrorism should be defined by acts, but in a broader con-
text than 1. above so as to include acts of governmental groups that violate
human rights and reinforce policies such as apartheid. This position was ad-
vanced primarily by the African states.
3. The position that the definition of terrorism resides in the motivation of the
actor and the context of the act. This argument claims that to consider terror-
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tion" of terrorism, "state terrorism" has emerged as a variation of the
more broadly recognized concept of terrorism."9 These three typologies of
violence in Sri Lanka help further to shed light on the need for funda-
mental changes in the political processes. They serve to identify the ac-
tion and reaction elements of violence, as well as the contexts in which
both are expressed.
From the emphasis on non-state actors as terrorists emerged a con-
cern on the part of some observers that the role of state actors in terrorist
activities was being neglected."0 Based on such fundamental tenets of in-
ternational relations as national sovereignty and national security, some
have viewed the role of state actors in the perpetration of terrorism as
evidence of employing a "cloak" to disguise the true nature or purpose of
the particular governmental policy.5 1 One author has stated that the use
of terror tactics "is common in international relations and [that] the state
has been and remains a more likely employer of terrorism within the in-
ternational system than insurgents and with much greater effect. The
state is as much a user of terror in its international affairs as in its do-
mestic activities. 5 2
Terrorism in Sri Lanka is thus recognizable on two levels: that perpe-
trated by the Tamil groups, as well as the policies promulgated and sanc-
ism narrowly, outside of national liberation movements, is to label inappropri-
ately a freedom fighter as a "terrorist." A variety of developing nations and
Arab states held this view.
Stohl & Lopez, Introduction, in THE STATE AS TERRORIST, supra note 13 at 4.
49. For an excellent treatment of the background to this analysis, as well as a descrip-
tion of sources available for the study of state terror as evidenced by political history, see id.
50. These policies may be observed in terms of their behavior toward particular groups
in the domestic political context, without regard to the "moral" considerations which the
actors may be pursuing on what they perceive to be a large scale. Stohl, International
Dimensions of State Terrorism, in THE STATE As TERRORIST, supra note 13 at 44. Stohl goes
on to describe three broad categories of state terrorism in international relations: coercive
diplomacy, covert behavior, and surrogate terrorism. Id.
51. Id. at 43.
52. With regard to the variety of internal pressures which a state may be faced with,
whether they are internally or externally generated, the government must respond to the
pressures. One author has identified particularly certain factors which can be attributed to
the government's attempts to maintain an adequate hold on its power, in particular through
the use of repressive means and serious curtailment of civil rights and increased use of the
military to implement the coercion.
Of all types of dynamic changes in the "state" of the state, this pattern is the
most pervasive in the recent political history of Second and Third World
states. It leads to questions concerning the particular political, legal, or extra-
legal mechanisms that actualize these alterations in governance and of the ide-
ologies of symbolic constructs that spark and legitimize them. This form of
rule has clearly emerged as a reaction to pressure for internal change of either
government policies and/or social structure. The government response has
been to withstand such pressure via new methods of persuasion, enforcement,
and coercive rule called "state terror."
Lopez, A Scheme for the Analysis of Government as Terrorist, in THE STATE AS TERRORIST,
supra note 13 at 61.
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tioned by the government designed primarily to act as "counterterrorism"
measures. These two levels are recognizable in that their perpetrators are
employing different means available to either group, as well as in the dif-
ferent ends sought by either group. Both types of terrorism play an essen-
tial role in the continuation of violence.
III. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AS AN INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERN
While it is true that the government of Sri Lanka faces a grave threat
to its national security and national unity from the Tamil terrorist
groups, it must respect human rights in its attempt to defeat that threat.
This involves more than merely balancing the damage due to terrorism
against the "relative value" of human rights. Protection of human rights
has been elevated as an elemental concern among international scholars
and policy makers, and as such must be respected at all costs. The gov-
ernment of Sri Lanka may not take action that defies the basic human
rights of its inhabitants, even though the very valid goal of this action is
the purported attainment of peace.
The political climate of Sri Lanka is especially illustrative with re-
gard to the promotion of certain repressive policies, and these more re-
pressive policies can be traced to the particular evolutionary patterns of
some of the government's institutions." The political climate of Sri
Lanka, involving both the actors and the setting in which they operate is
of crucial importance to any evaluation of counter-terrorist policies. The
use of repressive policies to counter the real or imagined terrorist threat
has had serious consequences for human rights in Sri Lanka. For this rea-
son, it will be illustrated below by identifying the relevant policies, that
the government is employing terror tactics violative of international
human rights standards in pursuit of its policy of state terrorism against
Tamil separatists and other groups.
A. Institutionalized Government Inflexibility and Overreaching
The government of Sri Lanka and the militant Tamil groups are
caught up in a cycle of violence. The government is in the better position
to break this cycle, and, we submit, is under an obligation to change the
policies that perpetuate the violence and violate international standards
of human rights. The PTA is a particularly reprehensible document, as it
undermines the inalienable human rights of certain citizens of Sri Lanka,
both on its face and in its application. The government has no valid inter-
est in its continued application, since after eight years it has proven itself
to be ineffective as a tool to curb terrorist activity. State terror is not an
appropriate response to the violent activities perpetrated by certain
groups in the country - it is illegal and counter-productive. The govern-
ment must attempt to reformulate its anti-terrorist policies, rather than
53. See generally, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1985, supra note 2 at 243.
1987
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
inflexibly adhering to an inappropriate course of action chosen in the
past.
1. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No.
48 of 1979
The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) was enacted by the govern-
ment of Sri Lanka as a temporary measure in 1979, as a response to the
increasing terrorist activity in the North. Section 29 provided that "[t]he
provisions of this Act shall be in operation for a period of three years
from the date of its commencement." The Prevention of Terrorism (Tem-
porary Provisions)(Amendment) Act, No.10 of 1982, however, repealed
this section, making the PTA a permanent part of Sri Lankan law.54
(a) Encouragement of improper interrogation techniques
Part IV of the PTA permits trial under special procedures which cur-
tail normal legal safeguards.5 For example, section 16.(1) provides ex-
tremely liberal rules on the admissibility of certain statements made to
the police, so that effectively anything a suspect mutters can be used as
evidence in court. Under normal Sri Lankan law, this is not the case. 6
Section 7(3)(a) of the PTA gives police the authority to take any suspect
"to any place for the purpose of interrogation and from place to place for
the purposes of investigation." These two provisions, read together, pro-
vide both means and motive for obtaining confessions and statements
under duress, and may encourage ill-treatment and torture during inter-
rogation. While these provisions do not, on their face, violate standards of
human rights, they have been included here because they are highly sus-
pect in their effective administration.
(b) Retroactivity of the PTA
Sections 22, 23, and 31(i) of the PTA attempt to make that docu-
ment and its provisions retroactive. The definition of "unlawful activity"
under section 31 expressly includes "any act committed prior to the date
of passing of this Act, which act would, if committed after such date, con-
stitute an offence under this Act." Sections 22 and 23 include similar lan-
guage. Such a provision is forbidden by both the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article
15 of the Covenant states that "[n]o one shall be held guilty of any crimi-
nal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offence under national or international law, at the time when it
was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that
was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed."
Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration also expressly prohibits retroac-
54. See generally, supra note 23.
55. See, e.g., Sri Lanka: Current Human Rights Concerns and Evidence of Extrajudi-
cial killings by the Security Forces, supra note 2. See also, supra note 27 and accompanying
text.
56. Id.
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tive imposition of criminal sanctions on actions that were not criminal
when committed. Thus the retroactive language of the PTA is invalid
under international law.
B. Allegations of State Terrorism and Self-Determination Issues
Concerning the issue of legitimization of "nationhood" which a state
is allowed to employ to effect its political goals (which may include engag-
ing in terrorist activities), both in the domestic context and often more
importantly, in the international context, Stohl has commented that
"[t]he legitimacy of the national state is itself normally conceived as pro-
viding legitimacy to actions that would be condemned as terrorism if such
behavior were executed by non-state actors."57
1. The Use of "Terror Tactics" by the Sri Lankan Government
Some of these means are discriminatory legislation, lack of protection
against the crimes and terrorist acts of other groups, and arbitrary or
mass arrests. Beyond merely cloaking such actions in otherwise "legal"
garb, the state as terrorist also may exercise extralegal activities and orga-
nizations for the goal of fulfilling other policies which may be too contro-
versial for the state to otherwise acknowledge its association.
Repressive policies conducted by The Sri Lankan government have
in many respects worked as a catalyst for the further escalation of vio-
lence and they have also fueled the desire on the part of many groups to
demand self-determination (through the formation of an independent
state). These actions by Tamil militants have in turn precipitated more
violent and drastic measures by the government. The consequences are
tragic in terms of the loss of lives and the human rights violations, but
another result of this escalation is the further alienation of previously
"neutral" groups, who are left with fewer options as a result of the height-
ened distrust and violence. 8
57. There also has been a continuation of inter-group rivalry among the Tamil separat-
ists. These have often produced bloody confrontations, as well as increased fear on the part
of moderates. Condemnation by Tamil groups of the violence perpetrated by the guerillas
has not brought progress, as the government has been unswerving in its demand for what it
deems "loyalty" on the part of its citizens. Moderates such as the TULF (Tamil United
Liberation Front) have found their position between the government and the Tamil gueril-
las more difficult as they were driven out of Parliament after the group refused to take an
oath supporting a unitary state. Crossette, Sri Lanka Violence Said to Open Critical Stage,
N.Y. Times, May 11, 1986 §1, at 9, col. 1.
58. One of the highly controversial policies instituted recently (1956) by the govern-
ment of Sri Lanka was the recognition of Sinhala as the official language of Sri Lanka.
Although this might otherwise be seen as an act to exclude Tamils from official recognition,
this action should also be considered in the particular light in which it was promoted. The
declaration of Sinhala as the official language was designed and promulgated as a counter-
imperialist effort, designed to effect the restoration of a basic form of national identity. See
Smith, supra note 30, at 90. This original purpose of the Official Language Act, however, has
proved to undermine the "national" identity it was meant to promote. See supra note 16.
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2. The Cycle of Violence
The government of Sri Lanka faces a very grave challenge - the elim-
ination of terrorist violence within its borders. It appears, however, that
its efforts, in the guise of the PTA and other anti-terrorist activities and
policies, have not met this challenge. Repressive government policies are
a major factor in Tamil complaints, so it is not surprising that additional
repression has not worked to decrease the violence. As terrorists react to
further government repression with renewed violence, the government is
placed in the uncomfortable position of either having to bear down even
further on policy implementation, or losing face. Thus, each side feeds off
the reactions of the other, and the violence is perpetuated. This is the
cycle of violence that must be broken before peace can be achieved in Sri
Lanka.
IV. OPTIONS AVAILABLE WITHIN THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM
The calls by Tamil groups for a separate state may be viewed as a
consequence of the government's policy of state terror against the Tamils.
Self-determination in this respect might be viewed as the only viable al-
ternative to a continuation of the present policies, or as a last resort. In
light of the situation which for so long had remained dormant in most
respects, the use of state terror has worked as a catalyst for the rise and
militancy of these claims by Tamil separatists.
The claims by Tamil militants stem primarily from the particular de-
velopments which have manifested themselves in the political environ-
ment of Sri Lanka in the last several years. The Sri Lankan government,
in its efforts to develop stronger political foundations of its own creation,
has implemented certain policies which have caused protest among many
members of its political community. It has become painfully apparent to
those in the forefront of the Sri Lankan political leadership, that main-
taining a multi-cultural democracy can at times lead to controversial deci-
sions and policies.5 9
A large part of Sri Lanka's history - especially dating back to Portu-
guese, Dutch and later English colonial rule until 1948 - has reflected at
least the potential for conflict among its ethnic groups (particularly be-
tween the Sinhalese and Tamils). This situation has been used for politi-
cal advantage on many occasions by the fostering of turmoil and distrust
among the groups by following a variation of the divide and conquer
technique."
This potential conflict became a political issue when Sri Lanka
59. For a discussion of some of the effects of colonial domination, see B. PFAFFEN-
BERGER, CASTE IN TAMIL CULTURE: THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATION OF SUDRA DOMINATION IN
TAMIL SRI LANKA 35-59 (1982).
60. See supra note 41. This attitude is not uncommon among government officials, who
choose to define narrowly the actual conflict.
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gained its independence and the British left. The Tamils had more read-
ily assimilated with the British institutions (especially the educational
system), and when the majority government began taking measures which
were designed to establish a Sri Lankan national identity, these pro-Sri
Lankan policies in effect worked as anti-Tamil policies. This view of na-
tional unity has provided the national security consciousness espoused by
many of the members of the government, who view the Tamil separatists
as ordinary terrorists who are simply trying to promote anarchy."
The government's response to movements for change as an attempt
to cope with difficulties is based on ethnic problems which have been and
remain an important consideration for both parties. The question of
whether the ethnic conflict is essentially a matter of differences based on
intergroup rivalry in certain spheres of influence within the political and
cultural setting of Sri Lankan society as it is currently ordered, or
whether the conflict runs deeper, in that the form of government is un-
suitable for the amicable conduct of relations between the parties remains
an important issue. The importance of this question relates back to the
nature of the conflict and the policies undertaken by the government. An
examination of this question consequently refers to larger issues concern-
ing the efficacy of the governmental institutions.2
The governmental responses to internal pressures for change which
have been expressed by the Tamils are especially indicative of its concern
for protecting what it views as democracy based on national unity. The
government's means of protecting this have very high costs, 3 and its re-
sponses to internal pressures for any change clearly point to an unwilling-
ness to identify problems facing the government in broader but perhaps
more realistic terms. As a result, the political climate has been and re-
61. For a discussion of this conflict, in terms of its sources and how these are reflected
in the administration of the government, see Samarasinghe, The Ethnic Conflict in Sri
Lanka: The Role of the NGOs, 24 ETHOS 1 (1985). Samarasinghe is of the opinion that the
choice is essentially up to the people - i.e., those who vote:
The people of this country entrusted their political future to the government
of J.R. Jayewardene in 1977. They did not give that power to priests, histori-
ans or self-appointed defenders of the Sinhala race .... There are three
choices open to the government. The first is for the government to push
through a solution of its own, which it has either been unwilling or unable to
do for the past seven years. The second is to hold a general election in the near
future. The third and most pragmatic choice is to form a transitional national
government with the sole purpose of negotiating an end to the ethnic problem,
and shortly thereafter hold a general election.
Id. at 13.
62. The government of Sri Lanka recognizes its role in the continuation of violence in
only a very limited fashion. It has admitted that there have been some problems with secur-
ity forces, but this "lack of discipline" which they have attributed as the major problem
concerning the conduct of the security forces, is viewed in only individual terms, and defi-
nitely not as part of any policy.
63. In this respect, the Sri Lanka government has been very astute in identifying the
goals of its counterterrorist policies. It has been able to "legitimize" many of its actions
under the guise of promoting national unity.
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mains turbulent." The extreme means of safeguarding the Sri Lankan
national unity by means of securing the state against the separatist Tamil
threat actually work against the ideal (formulated and espoused by the
government) of the Sri Lankan sovereign unity. The government will not
be able to extract national unity at any cost, and its means of dealing
with the Tamil threat are backfiring in many ways.
The policies of the current Sri Lankan government may prove to
have very substantial consequences for the future leadership of a govern-
ment which hopes to lead and support all members of Sri Lankan society.
Currently, as the results of certain policies over the last several years
emerge, the prospects for effective national leadership have become pre-
carious. In this light, the claim for self-determination (secession) ad-
vanced by certain Tamil groups will be examined, as well as a less drastic
alternative which has been the subject of speculation recently: devolution.
A. Analysis of Claims to Secede
In the Sri Lankan context, self-determination claims asserted by the
Tamils can be identified as a consequence of the state terrorism currently
being conducted in that country. In an analysis of claims for self-determi-
nation which would give rise to secession in this instance, certain consid-
erations must be carefully weighed.
Self-determination is considered a drastic step in the current interna-
tional order. The elimination of colonialism was the primary force behind
self-determination in its early stages, but it might now also be applied to
noncolonial situations. Standards for recognizing the legitimacy of claims
to the right to secede impose difficult hurdles upon the group claiming
the right. The establishment of minimum standards of legitimacy of the
claim require the identification of at least four elements: identification of
the group claiming the right - including objective and subjective ele-
ments; the nature and scope of the minority group's claim as articulated
by the elites of the group; the underlying reasons for their claim, whether
they are compelling - these include consideration of the divergent politi-
cal beliefs, strength of desire to control their own resources more effec-
tively, and the strength of the ethnic or cultural identification with the
neighboring group; and the degree of deprivation of basic human rights -
the severity of the deprivation, whether the group suffers subjugation,
domination or exploitation, and the extent to which individuals are de-
nied the right to participate.6 5
64. This turbulence is also indicated by the calls of some Tamil groups for secession
and self-determination. Self-determination does not appear to be a reasonable or viable op-
tion for the Tamils. Tamil secession from this small island nation is not likely to provide a
peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict. The concept of self-determination is problematic
under international law, although its parameters have often been identified and discussed.
See, e.g., H. GROS-EsPIELL, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED
NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 405/ Rev. 1 (1980).
65. These elements are taken from Nanda, Self-Determination Under International
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Alienation of the subgroup will be considered in the first element.
This will include the treatment of the subgroup by the dominant group in
their political system. Also considered here is whether the articulated de-
mands stated by the subgroup are widely held within the group. In the
Sri Lankan context, the Tamils do not appear to be unified in their call
for secession. The groups calling for a separate state of Eelam do not es-
pouse the majority view of the Tamils. The reasons underlying the claim
for secession should also be compelling. Self-determination must be con-
sidered in the political context of the state from which the subgroup
wishes to secede. Participation may be a critical factor in the Sri Lankan
context, but it is unlikely that the founding of a separate state of Eelam
will provide peaceful settlement. On the contrary, it would likely add fur-
ther to the existing alienation and the "minority complex" which the
Sinhalese feel. Finally, deprivation of basic human rights of the group
and individuals within the group is considered. Once again, strict stan-
dard is applied, and given the Sri Lankan parliamentary system, some
form of peaceful settlement with the use of further communication and
negotiation between the groups is highly recommended. Although it has
been suggested for several years by the Sri Lankan government, devolu-
tion appears to be the most promising means by which a peaceful settle-
ment might be reached.
B. Devolution of Power
Pluralism and integration need not be competing factors in govern-
mental efforts to improve minority relations, and non-discrimination may
be seen as a precondition concerning the implementation of rights of per-
sons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. Generally, the
rights of minority groups are comprised primarily of the right of persons
belonging to ethnic minorities to enjoy their own culture; to profess and
practice their own religion; and the right of persons belonging to linguis-
tic minorities to use their own language. 6
Devolution in the Sri Lankan context would provide governmental
competency to provincial institutions, and if certain concessions were
made by the national government (especially in the field of education),
Tamils would have the benefit of controlling their way of life. 7
The prospects for devolution in the current Sri Lankan political sys-
tem remain tentative at best. It is also apparent, however, that devolution
will not cause further splintering of an already fragmented populace. The
release of certain governmental competencies of a local nature to local
Law: Validity of Claims to Secede. 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
66. Devolution has also been discussed in some of the Peace Talks. See supra note 41.
67. A brief discussion of some of these conciliation efforts (New Delhi, June 1985;
Thimpu, July and August 1985; and New Delhi, August 1985) is contained in Address to
Parliament By The President on 20th February, 1986 (1986), English version at 2-4.
1987
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
authorities will ease ethnic tensions and provide a wider and more mean-
ingful base of authority for particular (i.e. Tamil) groups.
In light of the prior discussion of the claim to secede it appears that
few substantial problems would actually be resolved were the Tamils to
form their separate state of Eelam. In order to put an end to the violence
in Sri Lanka the government must take some kind of action to address
the grievances of the Tamil minority. Perhaps a devolution of government
authority will achieve these ends, without the destruction of territorial
integrity inherent in secession.
C. Implementation of Devolution
Efforts at resolving the Tamil problem have been made in a number
of different settings. The government, as well as some of the Tamil
groups, has sought help from other nations.68 These efforts have not been
characterized by successful negotiations, but the fact that these have
taken place remains an important factor.6 9
The viable prospects for the government of Sri Lanka regarding the
resolution of the Tamil problem as well as considerations for the future
efficacy of current political institutions are, in the view of the govern-
ment, quite limited. Based partly on its intransigence concerning the
character of the current political conflict, the government has identified
the conflict as one in which the actors must decide their allegiance based
upon their loyalty to Sri Lankan political institutions, with the current
administration as the embodiment thereof.70 This extremely narrow view
can be attributed to the stage of political development of Sri Lanka's sys-
tem of government. Although this is not meant to explain away any of its
abusive practices, it does shed some light on why the government has
drawn the reins so tightly.
V. CONCLUSION
The government's response to this basic problem is inadequate. Al-
though it has often not been a carefully calculated or coordinated effort,
the government's response to Tamil militancy indicates a strong willing-
68. Prime Minister Gandhi has been involved in many of these efforts, but the "good
neighbor" policy has brought about little effective change, and controversies and accusations
of bad faith resulted in disappointment. Weisman, A Region Has Difficulty Staying on
Speaking Terms, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1986, §4, at 3, col. 1. Shifts in India's policy toward
the Tamil separatists who had previously been using the Indian state of Tamil Nadu as a
sanctuary have also had a significant impact on the relationship between the Tamils and the
Sri Lankan government. Weisman, India Arrests Several Top Leaders of Sri Lanka Sepa-
ratist Guerillas, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1986, at 15, col. 1. The endorsement of the Sri
Lankan government's offers played an important role in certain regional efforts to resolve
the problem. Weisman, Gandhi Endorses Sri Lankan Stand on Strife, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18,
1986, at 14, col. 1.
69. See supra note 52.
70. See generally, supra notes 16, 17.
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ness to employ terror tactics to repress vocal elements. The policy might
be characterized as one which is reflective of the existing inconsistencies
of the current form of government.7' The incapability of the government
to control various forms and means of its authority has frequently re-
sulted in violence initiated by (in particular the armed forces) elements
within the government or actively supported by it which demand and re-
ceive legitimization from the government.
71. Whether this legitimization is actually indicative of a concerted effort to repress
certain elements (largely Tamil) is irrelevant. This phenomenon relates back, and signifi-
cantly so, to the incapabilities of the government.
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